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Abstract. This paper develops a theory of socially determined aspirations, and the in-
teraction of those aspirations with growth and inequality. The interaction is bidirectional:
economy-wide outcomes determine individual aspirations, which in turn determine invest-
ment incentives and social outcomes. Thus aspirations, income and the distribution of
income evolve jointly. When capital stocks lie in some compact set, steady states distribu-
tions must exhibit inequality and are typically clustered around local poles. When sustained
growth is possible, initial histories matter. Either there is convergence to an equal distri-
bution (with growth) or there is perennial relative divergence across clusters, with within-
cluster convergence. A central feature that drives these results is that aspirations that are
moderately above an individual’s current standard of living tend to encourage investment,
while still higher aspirations may lead to frustration.
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11. INTRODUCTION
In the 2014 general elections of India, the incumbent United Progressive Alliance was
handed a resounding defeat by the National Democratic Alliance, led by the Bharatiya
Janata Party. Yet in the two-term decade that the United Progressive Alliance governed
India, GDP per capita grew at the impressive rate of 7.6% per year. As Ghatak, Ghosh, and
Kotwal (2014) observe, “[G]rowth accelerated, Indians started saving and investing more,
the economy opened up, foreign investment came rushing in, poverty declined sharply and
building of infrastructure gathered pace . . . [But a] period of fast growth in a poor country
can put significant stress on the system which it must cope with. Growth can also unleash
powerful aspirations as well as frustrations. . . ”
This is a paper about aspirations, the individual incentives to invest, and the evolution
of economic inequality. The topic of inequality needs little introduction. Within-country
disparities have been on the increase — in some cases quite dramatically — in many parts
of the developed and developing world, and the Indian example cited above is just one
of many instances. The study of economic divergence has been conducted from several
quarters; among them, nonconvexities, occupational choice, institutions and technological
change.2 More recently, there has been some emphasis on psychological constraints to
savings and accumulation that could generate poverty traps and widening inequality.3 Our
paper fits into this last category.
Following Appadurai (2004) and Ray (1998, 2006), we describe a model of socially de-
pendent “aspirations,” one that incorporates both the inspiration of higher goals and the po-
tential frustrations that can result. Both individual experience and the social environment
condition aspirations. We address: (a) how aspirations are formed, (b) individual reactions
to aspirations, and (c) the aggregation of behavior to derive society-wide outcomes.
2See, e.g., Becker and Tomes (1979), Loury (1981), Dasgupta and Ray (1986), Freeman (1996), Banerjee
and Newman (1993), Galor and Zeira (1993), Acemoglu (2002), Mookherjee and Ray (2003), Matsuyama
(2004), Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), and Piketty (2014).
3See Appadurai (2004), Bernheim, Ray, and Yeltekin (1999, 2015) and Banerjee and Mullainathan (2010).
2On (a): we define utilities around “thresholds” and interpret those thresholds as aspirations.
Aspirations are endogenous: they are influenced both by individual circumstances and the
ambient income distribution.4 This social impact on aspirations may be “global” (for in-
stance, an individual’s aspirations may be related to the mean of the entire distribution)
or “local” (for instance, an individual could be constrained by what she perceives of the
distribution in some cognitive window). On (b): the crossing of an aspirational threshold
generates an extra payoff. This “add-on” payoff is defined on the difference between out-
comes and aspirations, and affects individual incentives to invest and bequeath. Via these
incentives, we describe both the encouragement and frustration that aspirations can create.
This part of our model stands on its own (i.e., without any “general equilibrium” consider-
ations) as an aspirations-based theory of poverty traps; see Propositions 2–4. We argue that
the “best” aspirations are those that lie at a moderate distance from the individual’s current
situation, large enough to incentivize but not so large as to induce frustration. This is in
line with evidence from cognitive psychology, sports, education, and lab experiments (see,
e.g., Berger and Pope (2011), Goux, Gurgand, and Maurin (2014), Heath, Larrick, and Wu
(1999) and Lockwood and Kunda (1997)) that goals that lie ahead — but not too far ahead
— provide the best incentives.5
Finally, on (c): while social outcomes affect aspirations, those very aspirations influence
— via the aggregation of individual decisions — the overall development of a society. As
a result, aspirations and income (and the distribution of income) evolve together. Our main
contribution is to embed the theory into a simple growth model with changing income dis-
tributions. In equilibrium, the overall income distribution influences individual aspirations,
which in turn shape the distribution via individual choices. The feature, highlighted ear-
lier, that the gap between aspirations and current standard of living can either encourage or
frustrate investment (depending on the size of that gap) is a central force behind our results.
4See Stutzer (2004) and Macours and Vakis (2009) for evidence on the importance of social interactions in
aspirations formation.
5To cite just one example from social psychology, LeBoeuf and Estes (2004) find that subjects score lower
on trivia questions when first primed by self-listing similarities between them and Einstein (interpretable as
raising their aspirations), relative to when not primed; and they score higher when asked to list the differences
between them and Einstein (interpretable as lowering their aspirations) relative to when not primed.
3We study the interaction between aspirations and inequality in two environments. The first
is a setting with bounded incomes. We define steady state income distributions: those in
which the implied aspirations regenerate the same distribution with which we started. We
show that such distributions cannot exhibit perfect equality, in contrast to the usual finding
of income convergence. Compression of the wealth distribution leads to some individuals
accumulating faster than others, destroying that compression. Specifically, a steady state
income distribution in our model is typically bimodal. See Propositions 5 and 6. The
second environment allows for sustained growth, and assumes constant-elasticity payoff
and a linear “A-K” production technology. Now initial conditions determine asymptotic
behavior. When the initial income distribution is “equal enough,” the economy converges
to perfect equality, with all incomes ultimately growing at the same rate. This is akin to the
standard convergence predictions of classical growth models. However, when the initial
income distribution is unequal, the economy begins to develop clusters, and in lines with
the findings of Piketty (2014) and others, inequality must progressively increase: under
some conditions, the distribution across clusters never settles down, not even to relative
stationarity. Yet there is convergence within clusters. See Propositions 7 and 8.
We provide a tractable model of socially determined aspirations though there are several
related questions left to explore. In particular, we do not provide philosophical or evolution-
ary foundations for aspiration formation, or indeed for why people should have aspirations
at all. Rather, we take these objects as primitives, and build on them. The particular applica-
tion we have emphasized here concerns the evolution of income distributions, highlighting
the endogenous feedback from distributions to aspirations, and the consequent impact of
aspirations on investment and income.
At the other extreme, there is also the task of extending the aspirations model beyond the
narrow economic sphere to which we’ve confined ourselves. We conclude the paper by dis-
cussing extensions to multidimensional aspirations and cross-group interactions, and how
such extensions might bear on theories of collective action or social conflict; specifically,
the use of targeted violence in such circumstances.6
6See, e.g., Mitra and Ray (2014) for an empirical account of Hindu-Muslim violence in India.
42. RELATED LITERATURE
While we draw on Appadurai (2004) and Ray (1998, 2006), we specifically develop and
build on the ideas laid down in an early working paper, Genicot and Ray (2009). Bogliacino
and Ortoleva (2015) consider a model of socially determined aspirations similar to Genicot
and Ray (2009). They assume that the aspiration threshold for everyone at any date is given
by the common value of average income at that date.7 Like us, they are also interested in
the evolution of economic inequality. The present paper is significantly different in that
it handles a wide array of aspiration-formation functions including those with bounded
cognitive windows. Unlike in Bogliacino and Ortoleva (2015), aspirations systematically
differ across incomes, and this heterogeneity plays a central role in the analysis.
The threshold-based formulation introduced in Genicot and Ray (2009) is also employed
by Dalton, Ghosal, and Mani (2016). However, they study aspirations that are generated
by private experiences, as do Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995) for aspiration-based satisfic-
ing in decision theory, and Karandikar et al. (1998) for aspiration-based learning in games.
In contrast, for us, the social aspects of aspirations formation are central to the analysis,
though we also incorporate private influences. The recent contribution by Besley (2015)
studies yet another aspect of aspirations formation, one in which parents can deliberately
affect the aspirations of their offspring in order to motivate them; this approach is con-
nected to Bisin and Verdier (2000). In our model, individuals do not choose their level of
aspirations. It is determined by their experience and the income distribution around them.
Our results contribute to a literature that explores the emergence and persistence of inequal-
ity, including nonconvexities (Galor and Zeira (1993), Matsuyama (2004)), occupational
choice (Banerjee and Newman (1993), Freeman (1996), Mookherjee and Ray (2003)), in-
stitutions (Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), Bowles, Durlauf, and Hoff (2006)), endoge-
nous risk-taking (Becker, Murphy, and Werning (2005), Ray and Robson (2012)), or mar-
riage concerns (Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (1992). In particular, our paper is related to
7See also Stutzer (2004), who discusses aspirations based on own income and average income. He then goes
to empirically assess the behavior of such a function but does not use it in a behavioral model.
5recent work on psychological traps due to lack of self-control (Banerjee and Mullainathan
(2010), Bernheim, Ray, and Yeltekin (1999, 2015)) or stress (Mani et al. (2013)). Our
findings also relate to empirical studies of “twin-peaked” cross-country distributions of
per-capita income; see (Durlauf and Johnson (1995) and Quah (1993, 1996)).
Our paper connects to the literature on reference points; e.g., prospect theory (Kahneman
and Tversky (1979), Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006) and Shalev (2000)) or models of habit for-
mation (Carroll and Weil (1994), Overland, Carroll, and Weil (2000), Croix and Michel
(2001) and Alonso-Carrera, Caball, and Raurich (2007)). In this literature, as in Dalton,
Ghosal, and Mani (2016), the reference point is personally determined (say, by consump-
tion history). As already mentioned, we emphasize both the social and personal determi-
nants of aspirations. In this sense, our inquiry has more in common with the literature
on status-seeking (see, e.g., Veblen (1899), Duesenberry (1949), Scitovsky (1976), Frank
(1985), Robson (1992), Schor (1992), Clark and Oswald (1996), Corneo and Jeanne (1997),
Corneo and Jeanne (1999), Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (1992), Hopkins and Kornienko
(2006) and Ray and Robson (2012)). In these contributions, individuals care about their
relative ranking in the distribution and these concerns could generate inequality.
There are, however, substantive differences between models of status-seeking and the
aspirations-based framework. At the heart of it is the fundamentally non-monotonic way
in which individuals react to the gap between their aspirations and achievements. Perhaps
there is a way to achieve the same effect in a status-seeking model, but to our knowledge
this has not been done. (Indeed, such a formulation would need to define achievements
relative to some target status, and then we would not be far from the aspirations model
anyway.) In turn, this non-monotonicity has novel distributional and growth implications,
such as the proclivity towards “within-cluster” convergence and “cross-cluster” inequality.
Finally, the aspirations-based approach is conceptually different as well; for instance, it nat-
urally lends itself to the study of limited cognitive windows in the formation of aspirations,
or to the comparative roles played by personal and social circumstances.
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FIGURE 1. ASPIRATIONS AND PAYOFFS
3. ASPIRATIONS, WEALTH DISTRIBUTION AND EQUILIBRIUM
3.1. An Intertemporal Model With Aspirations. Consider a society populated by a large
number of single-parent single-child families. Each person lives for a single period. A
parent-child sequence forms a dynasty. A typical member of any generation has a lifetime
income (or wealth) y, and allocates y over her lifetime consumption c and investments to
affect the wealth of her child z, so as to maximize payoff: u(c) + w0(z) + w1(e).
The first of these three terms is the utility u from own consumption c; increasing, smooth
and strictly concave with unbounded steepness at zero. The second and third terms pertain
to utility derived from the child’s wealth z. The function w0 is “intrinsic” parental utility
derived from the wealth of the child. The function w1 represents “milestone utility,” the
return that parents receive from the excess e = max{z−a, 0} of their child’s wealth z over
the aspiration a of the parent. An aspiration thus acts as a reference point for the agent.
Section 3.2 will show how it is shaped by the agent’s income and the ambient distribution
of income. We assume that w0 and w1 are increasing, smooth and strictly concave.
Figure 1, Panel A, depicts the function w0(z)+w1(max{z−a, 0}). We make five remarks.
First, as in Stutzer (2004) and Luttmer (2005), higher current aspirations never increase
current payoffs (Panel B). Whether or not it increases the payoffs to the next generation
depends on how marginal incentives to accumulate are affected; more below. Second, one
7can write down a variant of this model with several aspirational thresholds (an “a-vector”),
with such milestones also shaped by the overall distribution. Third, our results are robust
to more general w1-functions that incorporate disutility in departing downwards from a. It
is only crucial that the aggregated function w0 +w1 display sufficient nonconcavity around
the aspirational threshold. Fourth, it is easy to incorporate variants in which the crossing
of the threshold engenders a jump in utility; i.e., w1(0) > 0. Finally, the intrinsic term w0
is defined on the wealth of the child, but it is not a value function in the sense of dynamic
programming. Writing such a version of this problem is possible but complicated, as it re-
quires parents to forecast the endogenously determined aspirations of all their descendants.
3.2. The Formation of Aspirations. Two approaches, by no means mutually exclusive,
connect aspirations to economic outcomes and so bring the theory full circle. One possi-
bility is to take an entirely private viewpoint: only one’s personal experiences determine
future goals. This is the approach in Carroll and Weil (1994), Karandikar et al. (1998),
Croix and Michel (2001), Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006), Alonso-Carrera, Caball, and Raurich
(2007) and Dalton, Ghosal, and Mani (2016). In this literature, the loop that runs from ref-
erence points to behavior and back to reference points is entirely internal to the individual.
In contrast, economic models of status achieve closure by using social outcomes external
to the individual. A broad array of possibilities is captured under the specification
(1) a = Ψ(y, F ),
where F is the society-wide distribution of lifetime incomes in the current generation.8
Thus aspirations can depend both on personal and social circumstances, though everyone
has the same aspirations formation function. This allows for substantial heterogeneity,
induced endogenously via varying wealths. Consider the following assumptions:
[Regularity] Ψ is continuous and nondecreasing in y.
8It is, of course, also possible to adopt a specification in which the anticipated distribution of wealth over
future generations drives aspirations. A previous version of the paper, see Genicot and Ray (2009), discusses
and compares the two approaches. We are comfortable with either model, but adopt the current approach
because the resulting structure is fully recursive and far more friendly to numerical computation.
8[Scale-Invariance] Ψ(λy, F λ) = λΨ(y, F ) for all λ > 0, where F λ stands for the distribu-
tion when all incomes in F are scaled by λ: F λ(λy) = F (y) for all y.
[Range Boundedness] min{y,minF} ≤ Ψ(y, F ) ≤ max{y,maxF} for all F and y.
[Social Monotonicity] For any y, Ψ(y, F ′) ≥ Ψ(y, F ) when F ′ weakly dominates F in the
sense of first-order stochastic dominance, with strict inequality if the dominance is strict.9
The first two assumptions are self-explanatory. The third, range-boundedness, asserts that
aspirations are social constructs and so located within the full gamut of observed incomes
in society.10 These three assumptions are maintained throughout the paper. Finally, so-
cial monotonicity states that an increase in incomes everywhere else, leaving a particular
individual’s income unchanged, raises that individual’s aspirations. We will be explicit
whenever this restriction is imposed, and we discuss the assumption further in Section 5.4.
3.3. Remarks on Socially Dependent Aspirations. A very general class of functions sat-
isfies our restrictions. For instance, all these conditions are met if aspirations are given by
some weighted average of y and the mean of F . But we do not intend to suggest that all
of F enters the individual’s “aspirations window.” The individual’s income positions her
within her social environment, summarized by F . In particular, it may circumscribe what
she “sees” of F . For instance, as in Ray (2003), an aspirations window could be “formed
from an individual’s cognitive world, her zone of ‘similar’, ‘attainable’ individuals . . . ”.
Such similarity — at least in economic space — can be accommodated by allowing a person
to place cognitive weight only on some population quantile around her. Incomes within the
window would then be used to generate aspirations at y. Or cognitive truncations could
result from the fact that individuals do not look to anyone poorer then them to form their
aspirations: they have “upward looking” aspirations as suggested by Duesenberry (1949).
9First-order stochastic dominance means that F ′(y) ≤ F (y) for all y. Under strict dominance, strict inequal-
ity holds for all y such that F (y) > 0 and F ′(y) < 1.
10Formally, we define Ψ(y, F ) for all y and F , even for y outside the support of F , but ask that aspirations
not wander out of the overall range of possibilities encompassed by y and F .
9Individuals might also use occupation, caste, religion, or geography, to form their windows;
see, e.g., Akerlof and Kranton (2000), Munshi and Myaux (2006), Esteban and Ray (2008)
and Mitra and Ray (2014). Our model can be extended to study group-based aspirations, in
which the population consists of several subgroups, or “ethnicities,” and their incomes enter
the aspiration formation function in different ways. With no cross-identity interactions,
such an extension is trivial as it would simply represent several co-existing copies of our
model. With interactions, fresh and interesting considerations would arise.
3.4. Dynastic Equilibrium With Aspirations. We embed aspirations formation into a
standard growth model. An individual divides her wealth yt between consumption ct and
a bequest kt, so that yt = ct + kt. That bequest yields wealth for the next generation:
yt+1 = f(kt), where f is a smooth, increasing and concave function. That fresh wealth is
aggregated into a distribution function for the next generation. For each date t and wealth
y, we have at = Ψ(yt, Ft). Let Φ(yt, at) be the set of maximizers of
(2) u (yt − k(z)) + w0 (z) + w1 (max{z − at, 0})
over z ∈ [0, f(yt)], where k(z) ≡ f−1(z). An equilibrium from some initial distribution
F0 is a sequence of income distributions {Ft} such that for every t, Ft+1 is generated from
Ft by some transition probability pt; i.e.,
(3) Ft+1(z) =
∫ z
0
pt(y, [0, z])dFt(y);
where pt agrees with Φt andFt: for almost every y underFt, Supp pt(y, .) ⊆ Φt(y,Ψ(yt, Ft)).
The following proposition is a trivial recursive exercise:
Proposition 1. An equilibrium exists.
3.5. Benchmark with No Aspirations. In a benchmark with no aspirations, an individual
would choose z to maximize u(y − k(z)) + w0(z), where we recall that k(z) = f−1(z).
Define
d(y) ≡ −u
′(y − k(y))
f ′(k(y))
+ w′0(y).
10
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FIGURE 2. THE CHOICE OF FUTURE WEALTH.
To avoid uninteresting cases, assume that the system pushes away from zero income; i.e.,
(4) d(y) > 0.
for y > 0 and small enough. We maintain this condition throughout.
At a stationary income y∗, the corresponding choice of continuation income z equals y∗.
If positive, it is described by the condition d(y) = 0. There could be multiple stationary
incomes, or none. We impose the condition:
(5) d(y) is strictly decreasing in y whenever d(y) ≤ 0.
This implies, in particular, that the benchmark stationary income is unique, whenever it
exists.11 This purges our benchmark model of possible inequalities in wealth that might
arise from a “super-normal” response of child wealth to parental wealth.
4. SATISFACTION AND FRUSTRATION
Return to our model, in which expression (2), u (yt − k(z))+w0 (z)+w1 (max{z − at, 0}),
is maximized. In Figure 2, the horizontal axis plots the choice of future wealth z, while
11It is easy enough to write down specific functional forms that satisfy this requirement. For instance, if
f(k) = Akα, then [D] holds whenever −u′′(c)c/u′(c) ≤ (1− α) for all consumption levels c.
11
the vertical axis records various benefits and costs. The benefit that accrues from next
generation’s wealth is given by w0(z) + w1(e1), where e1 = max{z − a, 0} is the excess
(if any) of wealth over the threshold a. The cost is the sacrifice of current utility, which we
can write as u(y)− u (y − k(z)), with a standard convex shape. Panel A of Figure 2 plots
both these functions. Given income and aspirations, our maximization problem seeks a
continuation income z that produces the largest vertical distance between these two curves.
By the concavity of benefits to the left and right of a, there can be at most one “local”
solution on either side of a. Finding an optimal solution involves comparing these two
local solutions, that is, solving at most two interior first order conditions
(6) w′0 (z0) = u
′ (y − k(z0)) /f ′(k(z0))
and
(7) w′0 (z1) + w
′
1(z1 − a) = u′ (y − k(z1)) /f ′(k(z1)),
the former if z0 < a and the latter if z1 > a, and picking the one with higher payoff.12
4.1. Satisfied and Frustrated Aspirations. Say that the aspiration a is satisfied if the
chosen optimal solution exceeds a, and frustrated if it falls short of a. The slight ambiguity
in this definition will be excused as the optimal choice of z will be generically unique, with
multiple solutions possible only for knife-edge values of (y, a). See Proposition 2 below.
We make two remarks. First, notice that if an aspiration is satisfied, the income threshold
is achieved in the very next period. This simplistic outcome is very easy to modify. If each
generation lives several periods, a “satisfied aspiration” need not be satisfied immediately:
wealth will be built up over the lifetime of the generation. Second, suppose that an individ-
ual has failed aspirations a, and is asked what her aspirations are. She may not report that
failed yardstick (as her aspiration), even though it is the relevant threshold against which
12Formally, by (4) and u′(0) = ∞, a solution z0 always exists to (6). If z0 ≥ a, then an interior solution z1
to (7) also exists, and it is the global solution. If z0 < a, and (7) fails for any z1 > a, then z0 is the global
solution. If a solution to (7) does exist for z1 > a, then choose the solution with higher payoff.
12
she has arrived at her current situation. We continue to use the term “aspirations” for these
reference points, but the distinction is important both conceptually and empirically.
4.2. The Effect of Aspirations and Wealth on Investment. Consider a change in aspi-
rations for some individual with given income. Such changes could be fueled by growth
in ambient incomes. Or they may stem from the rise of mass media that brings particular
socioeconomic groups into focus, thus affecting aspirations.13
When aspirations are close to zero, the optimal solution must strictly exceeds aspirations,
and so they are satisfied. As long as aspirations remain in the “satisfaction zone,” an in-
crease in aspirations incentivizes growth: investment rises with aspirations. But there is
an aspiration threshold a∗ (illustrated in Panel A of Figure 3) when there is a sudden turn-
around from satisfaction to frustration: this switch will be accompanied by a discontinuous
fall in investment; inspect (6) and (7). Once in the “frustration zone,” investment becomes
insensitive to further increases in aspirations. Proposition 2 formalizes this discussion:
Proposition 2. For any given initial wealth, there is a unique threshold value of aspira-
tions below which aspirations are satisfied, and above which they are frustrated. As long
as aspirations are satisfied, chosen wealth grows with aspirations. Once aspirations are
frustrated, chosen wealth becomes insensitive to aspirations.
The insensitivity of chosen wealth to aspirations (once frustrated) is an artifact of the ex-
treme minimality of the model. In the Online Appendix, we describe a natural extension
that causes investment to decline with rising aspirations, once aspirations are frustrated.
A variant of Proposition 2 applies not just to changing aspirations under some given wealth,
but more generally to the ratio of aspirations to wealth. The scale-invariance of aspirations
permits us to examine this not just for absolute levels but for rates of investment, and so
for growth rates along the cross-section of individual wealths. To do so, we introduce an
13See Jensen and Oster (2009) and Ferrara, Chong, and Duryea (2012) for evidence on how cable television
can expose people to different lifestyles, thereby affecting their aspirations and fertility preferences.
13
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FIGURE 3. RESPONSE OF INVESTMENT TO ASPIRATIONS.
important special case of our model that is particularly conducive to the study of endoge-
nous growth. Call it the constant elasticity growth model. It has the following components.
First, we impose an “A-K” setting in which the production function is linear:
(8) f(k) = ρk
where ρ > 1 is some constant return on capital holdings. This formulation accommodates
exogenous labor income in every period. We can also include a credit limit on borrowing
based on future labor income; it will make no difference to the results.14
Next, we assume that utilities are constant-elasticity, with the same elasticity for each utility
indicator:15
(9) u(c) = c1−σ, w0(z) = δz1−σ, and w1(e) = δpie1−σ
where σ ∈ (0, 1), δ > 0 is a measure of discounting, pi > 0 is a measure of the additional
value of crossing the aspiration, and e is the excess of z over aspirations.
14As in Bernheim, Ray, and Yeltekin (2015), if each generation earns a constant labor income ` in addition to
receiving bequests, then yt = ft+ [ρ`/(ρ−1)], where ft is financial wealth. If she can borrow some fraction
(1−λ) of future income, then that translate into a lower bound on total wealth y, given by B = λρ`/(ρ− 1).
15Given constant elasticity, the use of a common elasticity σ for the utility and aspirational components is
unavoidable. Indeed, imagine scaling up aspirations and income together. If the elasticities differ, then at least
one of these terms will either become relatively insignificant or unboundedly dominant. To retain the relative
importance of both intrinsic consumption and aspirations, we use the same elasticity for each function.
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The expositional advantage of the constant elasticity growth model is that, in the absence
of aspirations, bequests are proportional to wealth and growth rates are constant across the
cross-section of wealths. We can therefore be sure that any cross-sectional variation in
growth rates stems entirely from aspirations alone. We now describe the growth incidence
curve, a relationship that links baseline income or wealth to subsequent rates of growth.
To this end, note that an individual with starting wealth y and aspirations a will choose
continuation wealth z to maximize
(10)
(
y − z
ρ
)1−σ
+ δ
[
z1−σ + pi (max{z − a, 0})1−σ] .
Let r ≡ a/y denote the aspirations ratio: the ratio of aspirations to starting wealth. The
maximization in (10) is equivalent to choosing a growth factor g ≡ z/y that maximizes
(11)
(
1− g
ρ
)1−σ
+ δ
[
g1−σ + pi (max{g − r, 0})1−σ] .
We solve this problem just as in the general case. First write down the first order condition
under the assumption that aspirations are met; that is, g ≥ r. The corresponding growth
factor g(r) ≡ z/y is given by the solution to
(12)
(
1− g(r)
ρ
)−σ
= δρ
[
g(r)−σ + pi (g(r)− r)−σ] .
Note that there is a unique solution g(r) to this equation in the region (r,∞) as long as this
region is “reachable,” which it will be provided ρ > r.16 Moreover, it is easy to check that
g(r) is strictly increasing in r. That is, analogous to Proposition 2, aspirations spur growth
as long as aspirations are met. The alternative is to entirely ignore aspirations, which yields
(via the usual first order condition), the growth factor g that solves:
(13)
(
1− g
ρ
)−σ
= δρg−σ.
16If ρ > r, then starting at income y it will be possible to produce more than a: ρy > a.
15
If g > r, then the g(r)-solution is optimal at y (because the latter “includes” the aspirational
payoffs while the construction of g does not). On the other hand, if g < r, then the
individual must compare payoffs from the two alternative choices given by (12) and (13).17
Proposition 3. In the constant elasticity growth model, there is a unique r∗ > 1 such that
for all wealth-aspiration pairs (y, a) with r ≡ a/y > r∗, continuation wealth grows by g,
and for all (y, a) with r ≡ a/y < r∗, continuation wealth grows by g(r). This value g(r)
increases in r, and is strictly larger and bounded away from g; that is, limr→0 g(r) > g.
The proposition states that if the aspirations ratio is high enough, aspirations are frustrated
and growth (or possibly decay) occurs at rate g. As the ratio falls, there is a threshold r∗ at
which the “upper solution” to condition (12) dominates the “lower solution” to condition
(13), and the growth rate jumps up. The end-point condition (4) implies that growth rates
are positive and therefore that this jump threshold lies above 1. Thereafter, growth rates
fall again as the aspirations ratio continues to fall, but because of the additional marginal
payoff bestowed by aspirations utility, never come down to the original “frustration rate” g.
Notice that this proposition says nothing about initial incomes, but matches initial ratios
of aspirations to income with subsequent rates of growth. The proposition does translate
into a growth incidence curve across the cross-section of incomes once we can connect
initial incomes to aspirations ratios. Our assumptions provide some additional mileage to
pin these movements down:
Observation 1. If aspirations are scale-invariant and socially monotone, then the aspira-
tions ratio r(y, F ) ≡ Ψ(y, F )/y is strictly decreasing in y for each F .
Observation 1 combines immediately with Proposition 3 to yield
Proposition 4. In the constant elasticity growth model, assume that aspirations are scale-
invariant and socially monotone. Vary initial income y along some distribution F . Then
17That is, she checks if
(
1− g(r)ρ
)1−σ
+ δ
[
g(r)1−σ + pi (g(r)− r)1−σ
]
>
(
1− gρ
)1−σ
+ δg1−σ , chooses
g(r) if this inequality holds, and g otherwise.
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FIGURE 4. GROWTH FACTORS AS A FUNCTION OF INITIAL WEALTH.
there is a threshold y∗ such that the growth factor is g as long as y < y∗, jumps up at y∗
and thereafter declines in y, but remains strictly larger and bounded away from g.
Figure 4 illustrates. With socially monotone aspirations the frustrated will constitute the
poorest segment of the population, so that roughly speaking, the growth incidence curve
is inverted-U shaped. The underlying idea that aspirations that are “reachable” serve to
inspire, while still higher aspirations can generate frustration, is the central argument in
Ray (1998, 2006), which we formalize here and will later apply to evolving income distri-
butions. It echoes Tocqueville’s account of the French Revolution, in which he repeatedly
stressed the point that greater economic wealth among the middle classes brought the priv-
ileges of the very rich into full view. And so it was that “[t]he French found their position
insupportable, just where it had become better . . . ” In summary, “[i]t is not always that
from going from bad to worse that a society falls into revolution;” de Tocqueville (1856).
More recent examples are not hard to find. We began by mentioning the Indian elections of
2014. India’s growth since the 1990s heralded the rise of an economically powerful urban
class. It is certainly consistent with a story of burgeoning aspirations with salubrious effects
on investment. But it is also true that large sections of the population were effectively
delinked from the growth process (see Banerjee and Piketty (2005), Deaton and Dre`ze
(2002) and Dre`ze and Sen (2013)). Along with the success stories that foreign investors
so like to hear, there is a subtext of apathy and despair, violence and conflict. Whether the
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potential for frustration caused by rising aspirations played a central role deserves more
investigation. But the observations are prima facie consistent with such a story.
Conceptually, this central point separates our theory somewhat from that of Appadurai
(2004). Appadurai speaks of an aspirations failure in terms of a failed “capacity to aspire.”
In the theory here, there is no such failure. Rather, societal conditions induce overly de-
manding aspirational reference points on some segments of that society. What fails is not
the aspiration, but the ability to live up to it. This is in line with recent literature which
argues that lowering the aspirations of low income students to more reachable levels re-
duces the likelihood of dropping out of school in the US (Kearney and Levine (2014)) and
in France (Goux, Gurgand, and Maurin (2014)).18 This discussion suggests caution in the
empirical implementation of the theory, urging researchers to properly distinguish between
the absence of aspirations, and the frustration induced by bars that are set too high.
5. THE JOINT EVOLUTION OF ASPIRATIONS AND INCOMES
In the previous section, we emphasized some partial effects of aspirations and wealth on
the subsequent growth of incomes. Because aspirations and incomes evolve jointly, these
effects intertwine as an equilibrium sequence of income distributions {Ft} (Section 3.4).
There are natural questions that one can ask of such an interaction. For instance: (i) Is
there persistent inequality in “steady state”? (ii) What is the relationship between initial
inequality and subsequent growth? (iii) How does inequality evolve along a growth path?
The first question is naturally suited to a setting in which incomes lie in some bounded
interval, while the other questions pertain to a setting in which sustained growth is possible.
5.1. Bounded Incomes and Stationary States. Consider the setting of Section 3.4, and
impose the end-point restriction f(x) < x for all x large enough, which bounds wealth as
in the Solow model. A stationary state is a distribution F ∗ on positive wealths such that
each dynasty replicates its starting wealth generation after generation. It implies (but is
18The importance of keeping aspirations attainable is also an important consideration for the policies studied
in Beaman et al. (2012) or Bernard et al. (2014).
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not necessarily implied by) a steady state: a distribution that replicates itself period after
period. Under a steady state, dynasties might “cross paths,” generating persistent mobility
but with an unchanging distribution. The Online Appendix discusses these concepts further,
and proves the existence of steady states.
Proposition 5. If aspirations are range-bound, no steady state can involve perfect equality.
This proposition comes from the convexification of utility caused by aspirations.19 Range-
boundedness implies that when incomes converge to each other, aspirations must lie in
this narrow range as well. However, when incomes are very close to current aspirations,
the marginal utility of accumulation is high in one direction and low in the other, and the
system must push away from this neighborhood. Whether it pushes upwards or downwards
will depend, as before, on a comparison with the two locally optimal choices on either side
of the current aspiration level. But the essential point is that the system cannot stay where
it is. The only way to have a steady state is to have a diversity of incomes in it.20
How seriously we view this result depends on one’s intuition about marginal utility as one
departs from incomes close to aspirations. Aspiration-fulfillment implies that an important
goal has been reached, and to the extent that there is some fundamental satisfaction that
depends on the crossing of that goal, and an important notion of failure on not reaching it,
local convexity is not an unrealistic property, and our model has that property.
Proposition 5 is related to the literature on evolving income distributions.21 The closest
relationship is to endogenous inequality, in which equality is destabilized by forces that
move the system away from global clustering. In Freeman (1996) and Mookherjee and Ray
19While such convexification could be outweighed by some other form of concavity in the system, such as
the curvature of the production function, our model rules out this possibility by juxtaposing a fresh source of
utility as the aspiration level is crossed (the function w1) on top of the existing utility from progeny income
(the function w0), thereby creating a kink that “dominates” any degree of (smooth) curvature in f .
20In the Online Appendix, we remark on an extension to the case of exogenous technical progress in this
bounded Solow-like setting.
21These focus on the emergence and persistence of inequality, and variously emphasize nonconvexities (Ga-
lor and Zeira (1993), Matsuyama (2004)), occupational choice (Banerjee and Newman (1993), Freeman
(1996), Mookherjee and Ray (2003)), institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), Bowles, Durlauf, and
Hoff (2006)), endogenous risk-taking (Becker, Murphy, and Werning (2005), Ray and Robson (2012)), and
the “twin-peaks” structure of per-capita income (Durlauf and Johnson (1995) and Quah (1993, 1996)).
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(2003), this happens because productive factors are imperfect substitutes, so that a variety
of occupations with different costs and returns must be populated in equilibrium. Together
with imperfect capital markets, this implies that in steady state, there must be persistent
inequality. In a different context, Becker, Murphy, and Werning (2005) and Ray and Rob-
son (2012) argue that endogenous risk-taking can also serve to disrupt equality, as relative
status-seeking effectively “convexifies” the utility function at high levels of clustering.
5.2. Bimodality. A stationary distribution of income must be bimodal:22
Proposition 6. Assume that aspirations are range-bound, scale-invariant and socially
monotone. Then a stationary state is concentrated on just two positive values of incomes.
This proposition tells us that a stationary state distribution F ∗ takes the form of a two-point
distribution (y`, yh, p), where y` < yh and p is the population weight on low-income earners
y`. Aspirations at y` must be frustrated, and those at yh must be satisfied. This proposition
is related to parallel results about the missing middle class in Genicot and Ray (2009) and
Bogliacino and Ortoleva (2015), though in these papers it is assumed that aspirations are
common to all (and equal to the distributional mean), whereas in the present formulation
the aspirations function is significantly more general.
There could be more than one solution to (y`, yh, p). The Online Appendix contains a
discussion on the possible solutions. Across these, there is a relationship between the
proportion of low-income earners, and the income gap between high and low incomes.
Specifically, as one moves from a stationary state with a high proportion p of low-incomes
to another with a smaller p, the income gap yh − y` must generally widen, because the
aspirations of the “satisfied rich” rise, generating higher investment. This potential tradeoff
between poverty and inequality is illustrated in the following example.
Example 1. Utilities are of the constant-elasticity form introduced in (9), with σ = 0.8,
δ = 0.8 and pi = 1. Let f(k, θ) = (A/β)kβ , where β = 0.55 and A = 4. Aspirations are
the average of one’s own income and the mean income. We study the class of all (bi-modal)
22We are not aware of a similar result for steady state distributions.
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FIGURE 5. INCOME GAPS AND POOR PROPORTIONS ACROSS STATIONARY STATES.
stationary states. The lower “frustrated” income will be determined by the benchmark
model and is invariant over steady states. But there is a range of steady states with different
values of high income (yh) and population proportions (p). A smaller “poor population” is
also associated with a higher income for the rich and greater inequality. Notice that only
values of p between pmin = 0.03 and pmax = 0.25 are possible in steady state. Figure 5
shows the high income yh and the level of aspiration as a function of p in steady state. The
high incomes steadily decline in the proportion of the poor.
To be sure, Proposition 6 is not meant to be taken literally: convergence to degenerate poles
is an obvious artifact (analogous to the Solow prediction of a single income level in steady
state). When there are stochastic shocks, the distribution will always be dispersed, as in the
extension of the standard growth model by Brock and Mirman (1972) and others. We could
easily introduce such shocks into the model at hand. The following example does just that.
Example 2. Assume the same preference parameters as in Example 1, but introduce noise
in the production function. Let f(k, θ) = θ(A/β)kβ , where β = 0.8,A = 4 and θ is a shock
with mean 1.23 Beginning with an initial uniform distribution of income and iterating the
distribution over several periods, the simulated distributions converge rapidly to a bimodal
23Specifically, we suppose that θ follows a lognormal distribution. The qualitative results do not depend on
the magnitude of the noise term, though in general, the degree of clustering must rise as the variance of the
shock falls.
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FIGURE 6. BIMODALITY IN A STATIONARY STATE.
distribution shown in Figure 6 where the only mobility is due to the noise in the production
function.24
There is evidence of clustering in the income distribution of various countries, including
the United States (see Pittau and Zelli (2004), Sala-i Martin (2006) and Zhu (2005)), and
especially across countries (Durlauf and Johnson (1995), and Quah (1993, 1996)).25 These
authors make a strong case for local clustering in the world income distribution and argue
that convergence is a local phenomenon “within the cluster” but not globally. Quah refers
to these local clusters as “convergence clubs.” We should also observe that bimodality is
not particularly sacrosanct: for instance, group-based aspirations within or across ethnic
groups or other partitions of the population would increase the number of clusters.
5.3. Growth and Inequality. We now turn to a different scenario which accommodates
endogenous growth. To this end, we return to the constant elasticity growth model in-
troduced in Section 4.2. In that model, all utility indicators are constant-elasticity with
the same elasticity, and the production function is linear, so that in the benchmark model
without aspirations, balanced-growth would result and inequality would remain constant.
24In the figures, we smoothed the simulated distribution using the density estimator “ksdensity” for Matlab.
In the absence of noise, the distribution concentrates on two levels on income: 95 and 1, 779.
25See also Henderson, Parmeter, and Russell (2008), Canova (2004) and Pittau, Zelli, and Johnson (2010).
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Our starting point is some initial distribution of wealth; call it F0. Initial aspirations are
given by the mapping a0(y) = Ψ(y, F0) for every income y in the support of F0. An
individual with income y will choose continuation wealth z to maximize(
y − z
ρ
)1−σ
+ δ
[
z1−σ + pi (max{z − a0(y), 0})1−σ
]
.
Recalling the analysis of Section 4.2, two options must be compared. The higher of the
choices involves the growth factor that solves equation (12). This solution, which we denote
by g(r), depends on baseline wealth y but only via the aspirations ratio r = a0(y)/y; see
Section 4.2. The lower choice involves a growth factor of g, which solves (13): this choice
is entirely independent of y.
Proposition 7. Consider the constant-elasticity growth model. Assume that aspirations are
range-bound, scale-invariant and socially monotone. Let F0 be some initial distribution of
wealth with compact support. Then there are just two possibilities:
1. Convergence To Perfect Equality: All wealths grow asymptotically at the rate g(1)− 1,
and normalized incomes yt/g(1)t converge to a single point independent of y0 ∈ Supp F0.
Or there is
2. Persistent Divergence: Ft “separates” into two components. There is a critical income
level y∗ in the interior of the support of F0 such that all incomes below y∗ change thereafter
by the growth factor g. All incomes initially above y∗ grow by some asymptotic factor
g¯ > g, with g¯ − 1 > 0. Moreover, there is normalized convergence of these incomes: yt/g¯t
converges to the same limit irrespective of y0, as long as y0 exceeds y∗. Overall, relative
inequality never settles: despite the within-group convergence, it increases without bound.
Growth Comparison: g < g¯ ≤ g(1), so that overall growth is lower under divergence than
under convergence.
Proposition 7 significantly narrows the way in which the dynamics of an income distribu-
tion can evolve. There are only two possibilities. In the first of these, the initial distribution
has a high level of equality, so that even the lowest income level is not frustrated by the
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aspirations generated under F0. That may be a tall order, but if it is met, then indeed all
incomes converge to perfect equality with sustained growth. Thus the basin of attraction
for an equal steady state with growth is a relatively equal society to begin with.
If that condition is not met, then the second possibility arises. Lower incomes fall short of
aspirations, the economy turns bimodal and inequality increases. Moreover, that inequality
never stops increasing, even in relative terms, with the income ratio between the satisfied
and the frustrated steadily rising. However, there is growth-rate convergence among the
“haves,” and there is even level convergence (after normalizing by their limit growth rate).26
Example 3. To illustrate Proposition 7, we use the same preferences as in Example 1.
Aspirations are given by an average of individual income and mean income. Production
is linear and deterministic with ρ = 2.1. Figure 7 plots the evolution of log income of
the poorest individual and at every 10th percentile thereafter, up to the richest individual in
an economy of 1000. Higher curves represent richer individuals. Panel A uses an initial
uniform distribution with narrow range, and generates convergence to equality with all
incomes and aspirations growing at a common rate. We show the panel by normalizing
trajectories by this limit growth factor, so that convergence can be clearly seen.
In Panel B we start with a uniform distribution over a wide range and end up with diver-
gence. About 15% of the individuals choose the low growth rate g; their aspiration ratios
progressively increase over time. The remainder choose a higher growth rate and in the
limit, the growth-normalized incomes of all these individuals converge. However, overall
growth is lower than that ultimately experienced in the more equal society of Panel A.
Other factors also affect the “chances” of equality. The Online Appendix shows that higher
rates of return, a larger weight on aspirational utility, or lower aspirations functions Ψ(y, F )
are conducive to equality, as are aspirations that are less responsive to the distribution.
26The assumed constant-elasticity of utility makes these results particularly transparent, but as long as we
use any utility function that allows for perpetual growth, we do not believe that the results of within-cluster
convergence and cross-cluster divergence would change. What would change would be the constancy of
growth rates over time for the frustrated, or the existence of an asymptotic rate of growth for the satisfied.
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FIGURE 7. AN ILLUSTRATION OF PROPOSITION 7.
We make two more remarks to end this Section. First, it is of some interest that in the
Solow setting, perfect equality cannot be a steady state while a bimodal distribution can.
Here, perfect equality can be sustained with a constant rate of exponential growth. On the
other, and again in contrast to the Solow setting, an unequal distribution with a constant
degree of relative inequality cannot persist with growth: that inequality will need to widen
over time, in line with recent observations made by Piketty (2014) and his coauthors.
Second, perfect equality exhibits the highest rate of growth compared to the asymptotic
growth of any other configuration. This latter rate is some convex combination of a growth
factor of g < g(1) for frustrated individuals, and an asymptotic growth factor that is at best
g(1) for the satisfied individuals. (It should be noted, however, that an unequal society is
temporarily capable of growing faster. For instance, in Case 2, the overall growth factor is
a combination of factors for various aspiration ratios g(r), where r begins below 1 and ends
above 1. By suitably choosing the initial distribution, it is easy to construct an example in
which this combination initially exceeds g(1). However, that excess cannot persist.)
5.4. Cognitive Windows and Social Monotonicity. Of the different assumptions that un-
derly Proposition 7, one merits particular examination. This is the social monotonicity con-
dition, which states that for given individual income, aspirations must rise when all other
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FIGURE 8. POSSIBLE FAILURE OF SOCIAL MONOTONICITY .
incomes in the society increase. In the presence of the scale-invariance assumption (which
is truly innocuous), social monotonicity generates a tight restriction: over the cross-section
of an income distribution, individual aspirations cannot climb faster than income. This
was formalized as Observation 1. It is this property that implies the bimodal clustering in
Proposition 6, and drives the proof of Proposition 7.
If individuals react to the entire distribution of incomes, the assumption of social mono-
tonicity is natural: if every income is “visible,” an increase in all incomes should raise in-
dividual aspirations, and social monotonicity is satisfied. However, as discussed in Section
3.3, individuals can have aspirations “windows” that ignore or put little weight on some
parts of the distribution. The following example demonstrates why social monotonicity
may be too restrictive an assumption when individuals exhibit such “cognitive truncations.”
Example 4. Suppose that aspirations are given by the conditional mean of income above
one’s own income; i.e., Ψ(y, F ) = EF (x|x ≥ y). Call this the case of upper mean as-
pirations. Consider the situation depicted in Figure 8. In the first panel, the upper mean
for a person with income y1 is located at a1. Now move to the second panel by increasing
income, so that the large mass of individuals who were within the cognitive window of y1
now disappear. Aspirations can now shoot up; see the second panel of Figure 8. By Obser-
vation 1, we see that social monotonicity must be violated in this example. Indeed, using
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scale invariance, this example can played “in reverse” by decreasing all incomes, keeping
individual income fixed. Note that aspirations rise as incomes come down.
5.4.1. Examples Without Social Monotonicity. To see the possible issues that might arise
when attempting to extend Proposition 7 in the absence of social monotonicity, consider the
following examples of aspirations windows. All examples will use the constant elasticity
growth model, and aspirations are assumed to be scale-invariant and range-bound.
Example 5. Upper Mean Aspirations and Balanced Growth. Suppose again, as in Example
4, that aspirations are given by the upper mean for every income. We can now look for, and
find, a distribution that is both non-degenerate and generates balanced growth at a factor
g > g, a situation that is ruled out in Proposition 7.
Observation 2. Assume upper mean aspirations. Then balanced growth with growth factor
g > g is possible if (and only if) the distribution of normalized incomes y/(1+g)t is Pareto,
and in particular has unbounded support:
F
(
y
[1 + g]t
)
≡ F (w) = 1− (A/w)r/(r−1)
for all w ≥ A and (A, r) such that r ∈ (1, r∗].
See Online Appendix for a proof. Notice that social monotonicity is not satisfied: the
aspirations ratio is constant over the entire range of incomes in the support of F . This
example can be extended to also generate balanced-growth distributions in which every
agent is frustrated, so that everyone grows (or decays) at the frustration rate.
The construction in the example — or in its extension where all agents are frustrated —
must rely on unbounded distributions. But this is not true of our next example.
Example 6. Local Income Windows and Balanced Growth. Suppose that aspirations are
determined only by incomes “near” one’s own incomes, thereby becoming completely “iso-
lated” if there are no such incomes. Call this the local income neighborhood model. Specif-
ically, suppose that for some β > 0, Ψ(y, F ) is completely insensitive to the distribution
outside the local range [y(1− β), y(1 + β)], for every y.
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Observation 3. In the local income neighborhood model, balanced growth is possible from
a distribution with compact support, and no individual remains frustrated forever.
In the local income neighborhood model, perennial frustration is impossible. The reason
is simple: given the fixed income-defined width of the cognitive window, other individuals
who grow faster than me must eventually disappear from my aspirations window. (See
Online Appendix for a formal proof.) It is then easy to see how isolated clusters of indi-
viduals, all with the same income within each cluster but income levels different enough
across clusters that they do not enter each other’s window, result in balanced growth. Ex-
ample 6 therefore permits balanced growth even under initial distributions with bounded
support, but at the expense of assuming the possibility of total isolation. The local income
neighborhood model assumes an extremely segregated world in which no individual “sees”
any individuals with incomes that are too different. That seems strong.
Example 7. Aspirations Windows and Relative Mobility. When aspirations ratios climb
with incomes, income-crossings are possible. Imagine that the distribution at any date
places point mass on three levels of income y1 > y2 > y3. Suppose that aspirations
windows are such that (i) the rich at y1 only see each other, (ii) the middle-class at y2
see y1 and have frustrated aspirations, and (iii) the poor at y3 see the middle-class but not
the rich, and have satisfied aspirations. These aspirations windows could be truncated on
an income basis, as in the previous example, or on a percentile basis. In this example,
assume the rich are satisfied and grow at some factor, call it g. Assume the middle-class
are frustrated and grow at factor g, and that the poor are satisfied and grow at factor g+.
Typically, g+ > g > g.
The example is now completed by two requirements: we suppose that
y2g = y3g+ and y3t g = y
2
t g.
Then the resulting distribution is identical to a distribution in which all incomes have grown
by g. The scale-invariance of aspirations implies that nothing has changed, save for the
middle-class and the poor who have exchanged identities. The normalized distribution
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stays the same, while dynasties trade places endogenously along an infinite set of dates.
Now, such infinite crossings are, in some sense, non-generic, as they impose requirements
on the distributional configuration that cannot be met except via the fortuitous choice of
model parameters and/or initial conditions. That said, one can construct even more complex
examples of sustained infinite crossings. While one suspects that similar considerations of
genericity apply to those cases, a formal analysis to that effect remains an open question.
It should be noted, however, that two dynasties can only cross if one is frustrated and one is
satisfied. If both are frustrated, a crossing is impossible as they both must evolve at the rate
g. The fact that a crossing is also impossible when both dynasties are satisfied is a more
subtle observation, and it is formalized as Lemma 3 in the Appendix.
5.4.2. Extending Proposition 7. In light of the previous examples and observations, it is of
interest to see which core features of Proposition 7 survive the dropping of social mono-
tonicity. We consider a weaker restriction, based on two ideas: (i) that higher rather than
lower incomes affect aspirations, and (ii) that income “crossings” can generate counterin-
tuitive changes in aspirations, as individuals move in and out of cognitive windows.
Specifically, for any F , let F−(y) denote the left-hand limit of the distribution at y. Suppose
that F ′ weakly dominates F . If y is the highest income in F , then we retain the weak
version of social monotonicity: we ask that Ψ(y, F ′) ≥ Ψ(y, F ). For lower income levels,
we ask that Ψ(y, F ′) ≥ Ψ(y, F ) only if there are no crossings “from below,” i.e., F ′−(y) =
F−(y). Finally, we impose the strict inequality Ψ(y, F ′) > Ψ(y, F ) if, in addition, F ′
strictly dominates F above y: F ′(x) < F (x) for all x > y with F ′(x) < 1. Say that
aspirations are minimally monotone if all these conditions are satisfied.
Minimal monotonicity is weaker than social monotonicity because of the no-crossing im-
plicit in the requirement F ′−(y) = F−(y). That is, the condition only applies when incomes
that are strictly less than y remain strictly less. Otherwise, an income crossing might worsen
the conditional distribution of incomes that an individual looks up to.27 So, for instance,
27This also explains why we do not impose the restriction on the highest income. There were no incomes to
“look up to” to begin with, so that the new higher incomes does not have any paradoxical effect.
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minimal monotonicity does not restrict the behavior of aspirations in the case of the propor-
tional increase in Example 4. Indeed, while the specification of “upper mean aspirations”
used there failed social monotonicity, it can be shown to satisfy minimal monotonicity.
The Online Appendix proves this property for a broad class of aspirations formation func-
tions that are “upward looking,” including those that have cognitive windows also truncated
above. What is important is that individuals are always cognizant of some incomes higher
than theirs whenever such incomes exist. Such a requirement is inconsistent with the sit-
uation in Example 6, where the use of an income-based cognitive truncation permits each
income cluster to be entirely segregated from the others.28
The following proposition characterizes the dynamics of an income distribution under this
weaker assumption of local monotonicity. To state it, define an income crossing (in equi-
librium) at date t by a pair of incomes (yt, y′t) with yt < y
′
t, but yt+1 ≥ y′t+1.
Proposition 8. Consider the constant-elasticity growth model. Assume that aspirations are
range-bound, scale-invariant and minimally monotone. Let F0 be some initial distribution
of wealth with compact support. Then there are just three possibilities:
1. Convergence To Perfect Equality: All wealths grow asymptotically at the rate g(1)− 1,
and normalized incomes yt/g(1)t converge to a single point independent of y0 ∈ Supp F0.
2. Persistent Divergence: Over time, the income distribution “separates” into two com-
ponents, with the measure of frustrated individuals converging to a positive limit. Their
incomes grow at rate g − 1. Among the satisfied, there is a common asymptotic growth
factor g¯ > g, with g¯− 1 > 0. Moreover, there is normalized convergence of these incomes:
yt/g¯
t converges to the same limit irrespective of y0. Relative inequality increases without
bound. Also, g < g¯ ≤ g(1), so that overall growth is slower than under convergence.
3. Infinite Crossings: there are income crossings across a positive measure of income pairs
over an infinite subsequence of dates, which is potentially compatible with balanced growth
and ever-widening inequality (though not convergence to equality).
28That is, the truncation (if any) will need to be defined in terms of population; e.g., awareness of the imme-
diate richer decile.
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Proposition 8 parallels Proposition 7 but is different in two ways. First, whereas in Propo-
sition 7 the identities of the frustrated are pinned down from date 0, this is not so in the cur-
rent proposition, where a frustrated sub-population emerges over time. We find this version
more realistic. The second difference lies in the presence of a possibility that Proposition
7 eliminates: that there are indefinite crossings of income ranks, as in Example 7. Such
a state of affairs is incompatible with convergence to equality: by range-boundedness, all
individuals would be satisfied after finite time, and as Lemma 3 in the Appendix shows,
there cannot be crossings among the satisfied. But infinite crossings are compatible with
balanced growth (cf. Example 7) or widening inequality. We conjecture — but have not
proved — that balanced growth can be an outcome only in non-generic cases.
Proposition 8 is proved by showing that if Case 3 does not apply, so that after some date
there are no more crossings, then either Case 1 or 2 must hold. Our central observation
is that past that date, once an individual is frustrated, her state of frustration is perma-
nent. Proposition 3 states that a frustrated individual exhibits the lowest growth rate of
all observed growth rates. If we renormalize the new income distribution by dividing by
this lowest growth rate, then, post renormalization our individual’s income is unchanged,
while all other incomes must be no lower. Moreover, because there are no crossings, no
previously poorer person has higher renormalized income. In the formal proof, we apply
minimal monotonicity to conclude that her aspirations are no lower in the renormalized
distribution. By scale-invariance, we can now “un-renormalize” the new distribution to
conclude that her new aspirations ratio is no lower than it was before. So our individual’s
frustration must continue. This yields a monotonicity property for the fraction of frustrated
individuals: that fraction cannot decline over time, and must therefore converge.29
Among the frustrated, there is no level convergence, but all individuals grow at the same
factor g. But everyone can’t be frustrated: by range-boundedness, the aspirations ratio of
the richest cannot exceed one and must be satisfied. Invoking Proposition 3, we see that
29Note that without social monotonicity, it is not necessarily the poorest that are frustrated at any date, but it
does follows from the proposition that, once all crossings have ceased, frustration and satisfaction are fully
correlated with income, as in Proposition 7. This is consistent, for instance, with the results of Stevenson and
Wolfers (2013) who find a significant positive relationship between subjective well-being and income.
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the satisfied exhibit a strictly higher rate of growth. Since there are no more crossings,
the frustrated remain at the bottom of the distribution. Hence, if the distribution converges
to a positive mass of frustrated individuals, there is ever-widening inequality, which gives
us Case 2. At the same time, there is convergence among the satisfied, so overall the
distribution becomes increasingly polarized into a two-class society.
Of course, it is possible that no one is frustrated to begin with. But then — once normalized
by the growth rate of the richest — there is level convergence this time among all individu-
als in the population, which is Case 1. There is also balanced growth in the limit, of course,
but — unlike Example 6 — that balanced growth requires equality.
6. CONCLUSION
This paper develops a theory of socially determined aspirations. We define aspirations as
income or wealth thresholds that enter individual utility as “reference points.” Those thresh-
olds are determined by an aspirations formation function that depends on both individual
achievement and society-wide economic outcomes. Aspirations determine an individual’s
incentives to invest and bequeath. Our theory captures both the inspiration and the potential
frustrations that can result from higher aspirations.
Individual-level behavior can be aggregated to derive the society-wide distribution of in-
come, thus closing the model. This equilibrium interplay between the individual and the
social is a central theme of the paper, and a study of society-wide equilibrium leads to
additional insights. In the Solow setting with capital stocks in some compact set, steady
state distributions must exhibit inequality. When aspirations are socially monotone — non-
decreasing in society-wide incomes — a stationary state (which strengthens somewhat the
concept of a steady state) must also be bimodal.
Turning to settings which permit sustained growth, we show that the constant-elasticity
growth model exhibits history dependence. When aspirations are socially monotone, only
one of two outcomes is possible depending on the initial distribution: either convergence to
an equal distribution (with growth) or perennial relative divergence with two components,
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so that ever-expanding inequality is the result. The resulting growth rate of per-capita
income is strictly lower than the rate achieved under perfect equality.
Our paper provides a tractable model of aspirations as a socially determined set of reference
points. It has allowed us to explore the relationship between aspirations and inequality. We
believe that the simplicity of the framework is also conducive to several extensions. We
mention a few of interest to us. First, individual aspirations could be a vector of milestones,
with the crossing of each milestone “celebrated” by an extra payoff. Higher milestones
would become relevant as an individual moves further up the income scale.
More generally, aspirations are multidimensional: not some narrow scalar notion such as
wealth, as explored here, but an entire complex that might include education, fertility or
social achievement. Developing the model along these lines would tie these ideas in with
the notion of capabilities developed by Sen (1985), except that such “capabilities” would,
in part, appear as a relativistic construct, inspired by the achievements of others.
A third extension, also influenced in part by the notion of group-based aspirations, would
link aspirations to frustration and subsequent violence. Such a model would extend the
simple allocative exercise in this paper to a three-way allocation across consumption, pro-
ductive investment, and resources spent in social conflict. This sort of theory would tie into
recent empirical analyses of uneven growth and conflict in developing countries, such as
Dube and Vargas (2013) and Mitra and Ray (2014).
To be sure, theories of aspirations and frustration also apply to the economically devel-
oped world. There is evidence that technical progress and globalization has led to uneven
growth, with large swathes of society left in the wake of that growth. The discontent and
frustration apparent in the US and in Europe suggest that such sentiments are partly rel-
ativistic, and driven not just by a sense of absolute stagnation.30 Our paper belongs to a
literature that speaks to such issues. Indeed, if one is willing to take these models more lit-
erally, it is possible to use growth incidence curves (say, by decile or percentile), along with
30Certainly, both absolute and relative considerations play important roles. Easterlin (1974), Frey and Stutzer
(2002), Stutzer (2004) and Luttmer (2005) are examples of research that emphasize relativism in happiness.
Stevenson and Wolfers (2013) argues that absolute incomes also matter to a large degree.
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controls to account for major policy or regime shifts, to estimate the aspirations-formation
process for different societies. If aspirations are largely socially determined, considerations
of inequality become paramount. Ensuring that all individuals retain a basic claim on some
minimal share of national prosperity, rather than a minimal amount, becomes the deeper
policy question that we need to put on center-stage.
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APPENDIX: PROOFS
Proof of Proposition 2. By (4), there is an interval (0, a] such that aspirations are satisfied
when a ∈ (0, a]. But u′(0) = ∞ implies that for a large enough aspirations must be
frustrated. Because w1(z− a) is decreasing in a, it follows that if aspirations are frustrated
at a, they are frustrated for a′ > a. So there is a unique a∗ > 0 such that aspirations are
satisfied for all a < a∗ and frustrated for all a > a∗. The first order condition (6) shows
that continuation wealth is insensitive to a in all such cases. On the other hand, (7) shows
that z is increasing in a as long as aspirations are satisfied.
Proof of Proposition 3. If an individual with r ≡ a/y chooses g = g(r) > r, then(
1− g
ρ
)1−σ
+ δ
[
g1−σ + pi (g − r)1−σ] ≥ (1− g
ρ
)1−σ
+ δg1−σ.
Since the left-hand side is strictly decreasing in r, anyone with r′ = a′/y′ < a/y has
satisfied aspirations as well and chooses the growth rate g(r′) that solves (12). Hence,
there is a unique r∗ such that for all pairs (y, a) with r ≡ a/y > r∗, continuation wealth
grows by the factor g, and for all (y, a) with a/y < r∗, continuation wealth grows by the
factor g(a/y). Restriction (4) implies that g > 1. It follows trivially that r∗ > 1.
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By comparing (12) and (13), it is easy to see that g(r) > g. Moreover, an inspection of
(12) shows that g(r) strictly decreases as r decreases from r∗. At the same time, g(r) is
bounded away from g (set r = 0 in (12) and compare the condition with (13)).
Proof of Observation 1. Consider two incomes y1 and y2 in the support of F , with y2 = λy1,
where λ > 1. If aspirations are socially sensitive, Ψ(y2, F ) < Ψ(y2, λF ), where λF is
obtained from F by scaling all incomes up by λ. It follows that
r(y2, F ) =
y2
Ψ(y2, F )
>
y2
Ψ(y2, λF )
=
λy1
Ψ(λy1, λF )
=
y1
Ψ(y1, F )
= r(y1, F ),
where the equality λy1
Ψ(λy1,λF )
= y1
Ψ(y1,F )
follows from scale-invariance.
Proof of Proposition 4. By Observation 1, r(y) decreases in y. So, once r(y) < r∗, g(r(y))
declines in y but is always larger and bounded away from g on y ∈ (y(a),∞).
Proof of Proposition 5. IfF ∗ is concentrated on a single point y∗; then, by range-boundedness,
aspirations a = y∗. There are two possible optimal choices at y∗, but neither of these
choices can be equal to a itself. For z = a to happen, we must have
w′0 (a) ≥ u′ (y − k(a)) /f ′(k(a)),
while at the same time,
w′0 (a) + w
′
1(0) ≤ u′ (y − k(a)) /f ′(k(a)).
Given that w′1(0) > 0, both these inequalities cannot simultaneously hold.
Proof of Proposition 6. First, we show
Lemma 1. If aspirations are scale-invariant and socially monotone, y1 − Ψ(y1, F ) ≤
y2 −Ψ(y2, F ) whenever y2 > y1 and y1 −Ψ(y1, F ) ≥ 0.
Proof. Consider two incomes y1 and y2 with y2 > y1. By Observation 1, Ψ(y2, F )/y2 ≤
Ψ(y1, F )/y1, so that
y2 −Ψ(y2, F )
y2
≥ y1 −Ψ(y1, F )
y1
.
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Because y2 > y1 and y1 −Ψ(y1, F ) ≥ 0, the result follows.
We can now proceed with the main proof. Fix a steady state distribution F . Consider any
two distinct incomes in the support of F . We claim that one of them must have unsatisfied
aspirations, and is the unique solution to
(14) −u
′(y − k(y))
f ′(k(y))
+ w′0(y) = 0.
while the other must have satisfied aspirations, and is the unique solution to
(15) −u
′(y − k(y))
f ′(k(y))
+ w′0(y) + w
′
1(y −Ψ(y, F )) = 0.
Because the solutions to (14) and (15) are unique (as we shall show), the proof is complete.
The fact that (14) admits a unique solution follows immediately from (5). Next, suppose
on the contrary that (15) admits two solutions y1 and y2, with y1 < y2. Because aspirations
are satisfied at y1, we have y1 ≥ Ψ(y1, F ), so Lemma 1 applies, and y2 − Ψ(y2, F ) ≥
y1 −Ψ(y1, F ). Using the concavity of w1, it follows that
w′1(y1 −Ψ(y1, F )) ≥ w′1(y2 −Ψ(y2, F )).
Because (15) holds for both y1 and y2, we must conclude that
−u
′(y2 − k(y2))
f ′(k(y2))
+ w′0(y2) ≥ −
u′(y1 − k(y1))
f ′(k(y1))
+ w′0(y1),
which contradicts (5).
Define aspirations ratios for each t and y > 0 by rt(y) ≡ Ψ(y, Ft)/y. By Proposition 3, an
individual with income y at date t is frustrated if and only if rt(y) > r∗.
Lemma 2. Assume that aspirations are regular and scale-invariant. Suppose that in any
equilibrium, an individual with income y is frustrated at date t. Then
(i) If aspirations are socially monotone, then our individual is frustrated at date t+ 1.
(ii) If aspirations are minimally monotone and there are no income crossings over y in the
change from date t to t+ 1, then our individual is frustrated at date t+ 1.
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Proof. Let y be frustrated under Ft. Let F = Ft, and F ′ ≡ F 1/gt+1 ; that is, the distribution
when all incomes in Ft+1 are scaled down by g. By scale invariance,
(16) Ψ(gy, Ft+1) = gΨ(y, F ′).
Next, because g is the lowest possible growth factor (Proposition 3), F ′ weakly dominates
F . It follows that if aspirations are socially monotone, then by the continuity of Ψ in F ,
(17) Ψ(y, F ′) ≥ Ψ(y, F ),
In addition, if there are no income crossings over y in the change over dates t and t+1, then
F ′−(y) = F−(y), and the same inequality also holds if aspirations are minimally monotone.
Combining (16) and (17), we must conclude that in either case,
rt(y) =
Ψ(y, F )
y
≤ Ψ(gy, Ft+1)gy = rt+1(gy);
that is, because y is frustrated and moves to gy, the aspirations ratio does not fall for y over
dates t and t+ 1. We must therefore conclude that his frustration must continue.
Lemma 3. Assume that aspirations are regular and scale-invariant. Suppose that two
incomes y0 and y′0, with y0 < y
′
0, both have satisfied aspirations under the distribution F0;
that is, r0(y0) ≤ r∗ and r0(y′0) ≤ r∗. Then y1 < y′1.
Proof. Consider y0 and y′0 as described in the statement of the Lemma. Because aspirations
a0 are satisfied at y0, (7) applies, and so
(18) w′0 (y1) + w
′
1(y1 − a0) = u′ (y0 − k(z0)) /f ′(k(y1)).
By regularity, aspirations at y′0, a
′
0 are no smaller than a0. Inspecting (18), which must also
apply to y′0, and using y
′
0 > y0, we must conclude from the strict concavity of w0, w1 and u
(and the weak concavity of f ) that y′1 > y1.
Lemma 4. Assume that aspirations are regular, scale-invariant and range-bound. Then for
any distribution F with compact support, the measure of satisfied individuals is positive.
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Proof. By (4), g > 1. It follows that r∗ > 1. But because aspirations are range bound,
r(y) ≤ 1 for some income y in the support of F . It follows from regularity that r(y) < r∗
for some set of individuals of positive measure under F .
For any F , let y be the minimum satisfied person and y¯ be the maximum satisfied person.
If y > 0, then this infimum is well-defined whenever aspirations are regular.31
Lemma 5. Assume that aspirations are regular, scale-invariant and minimally monotone.
Suppose that 0 < y
t
< y¯t at date t. Then, yt grows faster than y¯t at date t.
Proof. By minimal monotonicity and the fact that y¯t > yt, we have
(19) Ψ(y
t
, Ft) > Ψ(yt, H
1),
where H1 is obtained from Ft by placing the mass 1 − Ft(yt) at yt, and altering nothing
else. Next, define η ≡ y
t
/y¯t < 1. Let H2 be derived from H1 by scaling every income
strictly below y
t
by η, while leaving the mass at y
t
untouched. By minimal monotonicity,
(20) Ψ(y
t
, H1) ≥ Ψ(y
t
, H2),
Next, scale every income in H2 by 1/η to get the distribution H3; then by scale-invariance,
(21) Ψ(y
t
, H2) = ηΨ(y
t
/η,H3) = ηΨ(y¯t, H
3).
By construction, H3 is just the same as the original distribution Ft, except that all the mass
between y
t
and y¯t has been allocated to the single point y¯t. Returning this mass to where it
was, and noting that y¯t is the highest income, minimal monotonicity applies again, so that:
(22) Ψ(y¯t, H3) ≥ Ψ(y¯t, Ft).
Combining (19)–(22), we see that
Ψ(y
t
, Ft) > ηΨ(y¯t, Ft) = (yt/y¯t)Ψ(y¯t, Ft),
31By our convention, a person is satisfied whenever r(y) ≥ r∗. This weak inequality is preserved in the limit
given that aspirations are continuous in y.
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or rt(yt) > rt(y¯t). Apply Proposition 3 to complete the proof.
Lemma 6. Assume that aspirations are regular, scale-invariant and socially monotone.
Then in any equilibrium, an individual satisfied at date t is satisfied at date t+ 1.
Proof. Define rt to be the supremum of aspirations ratios that are no larger than r
∗ under
the distribution Ft, and let y be some income corresponding to this value. By Proposition
3, an individual located at y will exhibit the highest growth factor of incomes; call it g¯.32
Letting rt+1 stand for the subsequent aspirations ratio (starting from rt), we then have
rt =
Ψ(y, Ft)
y
=
Ψ(g¯y, F g¯t )
g¯y
≥ Ψ(g¯y, Ft+1)
g¯y
= rt+1,
where the second equality follows from scale invariance and the third from social mono-
tonicity (the latter because F g¯t FOSD Ft+1). So
(23) rt+1 ≤ rt ≤ r∗.
Now consider any yt with rt(y) ≤ rt. By Observation 1, we have yt ≥ yt. By Lemma 3,
yt+1 ≥ yt+1.33 Again applying Observation 1, we have rt+1(yt+1) ≤ rt+1. Combining this
observation with (23), we must conclude that
rt+1(yt+1) ≤ rt+1 ≤ rt ≤ r∗.
So aspirations are also satisfied at date t+1 for the person with initial income yt.
Proof of Proposition 7. We adopt the innocuous convention that if an individual is indiffer-
ent between the higher and lower growth rates, she chooses the higher rate.34 We consider
three cases:
Case 1: infy r0(y) > r∗. This is ruled out by Lemma 4.
32We invoke the convention that the upper choice is made at r∗, in case rt = r
∗.
33More precisely, this is true from Lemma 3 if yt > yt. If equality holds, then yt+1 = yt+1, except
conceivably when r(yt) = r∗, but here we use the convention that the upper solution is chosen.
34For the purpose of this proposition, any other convention works just as well, and so does no convention at
all, but this simplifies the exposition.
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Case 2: supy r0(y) ≤ r∗. Then all individuals are satisfied at date 0, and so by Lemma 6,
will remain satisfied forever. Letmt be the ratio of infimum to supremum incomes at date t.
By Lemmas 3 and 5, mt is strictly increasing and bounded above by 1, so it must converge.
But in that limit the lowest income must be growing at the same rate as the highest income.
By Lemma 5 again, that can only happen if the limit equals 1. In particular, all aspiration
ratios under the sequence Ft must converge to 1. It follows that the growth rate converges
to g(1). That g(1) > 1 follows from inspecting (12) with r set equal to 1.
Case 3: infy r0(y) < r∗ < supy r0(y). By Lemma 6, the growth factor of all individuals
with r0(y) > r∗ must be g in all periods. By contrast, every individual with r0(y) ≤ r∗
must grow at a strictly higher rate than g; indeed, bounded away from g (Proposition 3).
That proves that inequality between the frustrated and the satisfied must grow unboundedly
high with time. As for those individuals who are satisfied at date 0, we follow an argument
parallel to that for Case 2, using Lemmas 3 and 5 to conclude that mt converges to 1.
In particular, the limit rate of growth of all satisfied individuals is the same. Denote this
limit growth factor by g¯. By Proposition 3, we know that g¯ > g. By range-boundedness,
the aspirations ratio of the supremum income is no bigger than 1, so g¯ = g(r¯) for some
r¯ ≤ 1. By Proposition 3 again, g¯ ≤ g(1). This proves the very last claim.
Proof of Proposition 8. Suppose Case 3 does not hold, so that there is a date T after which
there are no more crossings by positive masses of people. We claim that Case 1 or 2 applies.
(That everyone is frustrated is ruled out by Lemma 4.) Lemma 2(ii), states that if there are
no income crossings, then a state of frustration will continue in the next period. That tells us
that the measure of frustrated individuals under Ft is nondecreasing in t for all t ≥ T , and
therefore converges. If it is nonzero, inequality must perennially widen, as all frustrated
individuals grow at rate g, while all satisfied individuals grow at rates that are larger and
bounded away from g. That is, we are in the realm of either Case 1 or Case 2.
Finally, convergence of incomes among the satisfied follows from Lemma 5, just as in the
proof of Proposition 7. The comparison of growth rates with that in Case 1 also parallels
the proof for Proposition 7.
